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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v* : 
JOSEPH GREG TRUJILLO, : Case No. 860203-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Category No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Statement of Issues, Statement of the Case and 
Statement of Facts are set forth in Brief of Appellant at pages iii 
through 4. 
ARGUMENT 
In the brief of Respondent, the State takes an interesting 
and fairly novel approach to this case. First, the State argues 
that Mr. Trujillo was not stopped or detained by the officer. 
Rather, when the officer blocked Mr. Trujillo's path and 
interrogated him, having already called for a back-up, this was only 
an innocuous citizen-police encounter. Second, even though merely 
an encounter, the situation almost immediately escalated into a full 
blown Terry frisk, a measure much more intrusive than an 
investigatory stop. 
By labeling the police officer's action an encounter rather 
than a stop the State seeks to avoid Section 77-7-15, Utah Code Ann. 
(Authority of a peace officer to stop and question suspect) and an 
entire body of law developed under the Fourth Amendment. Under the 
facts of the present case the State's distinction between 
"encounter" and "stop", is meaningless and artificial. The State 
has not attempted to justify the officer's action as a valid stop 
supported by reasonable suspicion of a criminal activity based on 
articulable facts because the facts simply will not support that 
result. Allowing the State to prevail under a "citizen encounter" 
theory effectively deprives Joseph Trujillo of the personal rights 
and protections he is guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution and Article I Section XIV of the Utah Constitution. 
I. THE STOP OF APPELLANT WAS A SEIZURE OF HIS PERSON 
A person may not be detained even momentarily without 
reasonable and objective grounds for doing so. Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983). Otherwise, a seizure of the person 
occurs. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). Such a seizure is 
constitutionally justifiable only when an articulable objective 
suspicion exists that the person seized has committed or is about to 
commit a crime. Florida v. Royer, supra, at 498; Reid v. Georgia, 
448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980); State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 
1985). 
In the present case, the State contends that the initial 
stop of Mr. Trujillo was a citizen-police encounter and not a 
seizure. Brief of Respondent at 4. The State contends its 
conclusion is supported under the rationale of two United States 
Supreme Court cases dealing with the stopping of "drug couriers" at 
airports. See Florida v. Royer, supra; United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544 (1980)(Respondentfs Brief at 4). Those precedents are 
distinguishable from the present case because of the transitory 
nature of airports and the government's compelling interest in 
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stopping the transportation of drugs. In those contextsf the Court 
permitted an officer to ask an individual to identify himself and 
briefly answer questions and only as long as the individual is free 
to leave with or without answering. See United States v. 
Mendenhall, supra. 
The Supreme Court, in a case subsequent to Royer and 
Mendenhall, expressly reserved ruling on whether police questioning 
of an individual, without more, amounts to a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment. I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). 
Under Delgado, citizen-police encounters are arguably limited to the 
special situational contexts of Mendenhall and Royer or are of 
questionable validity altogether. 
Even accepting, arguendo, that Mendenhall and Royer are 
applicable to the present case, Mr. Trujillo's detention exceeds a 
mere citizen-police encounter. In Mendenhall, the Court stated that 
a person is detained or "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the 
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not 
free to leave. U.S. v. Mendenhall, supra at 554. 
In the present case, Mr. Trujillo reasonably believed that 
he was detained and "seized" by the officer. The police officer had 
been driving very slowly, about five to ten miles per hour (T. 17); 
he approached Mr. Trujillo and his friends from behind pulling along 
side them next to the curb (T. 17). The officer then drove down the 
street, parked the car ahead of them and walked back towards the 
trio, effectively blocking their path of travel (T. 9, 23). The 
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officer testified that at this point the citizens appeared "nervous" 
about his presence (T. 24). He told the trio to stop and not to go 
anywhere (T. 39). 
Officer Beesley began questioning the three men and 
testified that their answers were evasive (T. 24). However, he 
initially asked what they were doing in the area and they responded 
that they were going to Mr. Trujillo's cousin's house (T. 26). He 
next asked for identification, which one of the trio produced; the 
other two told him their names (T. 26). One minute into the 
questioning, a second officer arrived (T. 11). This was the backup 
officer that Officer Beesley had requested prior to exiting his car 
when he notified dispatch that he "was going to be, as we call it, 
shaking or talking to some individuals, three individuals on the 
corner of Fourth South and State" (T. 10). The arrival of the 
second officer provided a show of force to the group and emphasized 
that the trio was not free to leave. 
The State cites United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223 
(Fifth Circuit 1984) as further support for citizen-police 
encounters, "[p]olice officers are free to approach individuals at 
any time and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained 
against his will." Respondent's Brief at 4. 
A brief review of the facts in Merritt discloses that the 
cited language is pure dicta. Federal and State officials stopped a 
vessel later found to contain drugs. The government never argued 
this was a citizen-police encounter. It consistently and 
successfully argued that the investigatory stop was supported by an 
articulable suspicion that the vessel was engaged in drug 
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trafficking. The Fifth Circuit affirmed that the stop was valid 
under Terry v, Ohio standards. Merritt at 230. The cited language 
was surplusage in Merritt; it is surplusage in the present case. 
The State cites State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah 
1984), to establish that "[a]n officer who is rightfully in a public 
place and who poses questions to an individual has not engaged in a 
seizure, detention or investigatory stop." Brief of Respondent at 
4. In Christensen, police officers were investigating a truck 
abandoned at the side of the road with an attached trailer partially 
obstructing traffic. The defendant returned to the scene in another 
vehicle, got out and approached the officers. The officers asked 
the defendant if he was the owner and driver of the vehicle. The 
Utah Court held that a seizure did not occur when the defendant was 
asked whether he was the owner because the officers were in a 
"public roadway, a public place where they had a right to be and in 
responding to the question, the defendant was not detained in any 
significant way." State v. Christensen, supra at 412. In 
determining whether a seizure has occurred, there is a marked 
distinction between an individual approaching officers and officers 
approaching a citizen and telling him to stop as occurred in the 
present case. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 provides: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may 
stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed 
or is in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
This statutory codification of Terry v. Ohio, supra, does not make a 
distinction between a "police-citizen encounter" and an 
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investigatory stop. The statute clearly requires a reasonable 
articulable suspicion for an officer to stop any person in a public 
place. 
In addition, two Utah cases illustrate that what took place 
between Mr. Trujillo and Officer Beesley was an impermissible stop 
and detention, not a citizen-police encounter. In State v. 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), an officer approached 
defendants in an all-night laundromat at 1:00 a.m. The officer 
asked the individuals for identification and what they were doing 
there. This Court held that "there was no improper seizure or 
detention in the questioning." Id. at 105 (emphasis added). There 
was "no improper seizure" because the officer articulated 
reasonable, objective facts upon which he based the stop. 
In State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), an officer 
stopped two men walking near the scene of a burglary. The officer 
told the men to stop and asked for identification. A back up 
officer arrived and the officers phoned in a warrants check. This 
court considered this a "seizure" and held that the officers did not 
have a reasonable suspicion based on objective facts to justify the 
stop. Thus, in both Swanigan and Whittenback, this Court considered 
the stop a seizure requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion. 
The actual stop in this case is similar to those in 
Swanigan and Whittenback. As in Swanigan, the officer ordered the 
defendant and his companion to stop. Unlike the situation in 
Christensen where the defendant approached the officers, in this 
case, Officer Beesley approached Mr. Trujillo and told him not to go 
anywhere. In Swanigan and Whittenback, the officers first asked for 
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identification. In the present case, Officer Beesley proceeded 
directly into an investigation by asking the individuals to justify 
their presence. Thereafter, he asked for identification and a 
backup officer arrived. Since the stop in this case is 
indistinguishable from those in Swanigan and Whittenback and Section 
77-7-15 requires a reasonable suspicion to justify any stop, the 
actions of Officer Beesley constituted a seizure. 
II. THE OFFICER DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION 
NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY THE SEIZURE OF APPELLANT. 
As outlined in Appellant's Brief, a police officer must 
have a reasonable, articulable suspicion based on objective facts in 
order to detain an individual. (Appellant's Brief 4-15). As set 
forth in Appellant's Brief, no such reasonable suspicion existed in 
this case. 
In support of the officer's actions the State contends that 
"[t]he appearance of these three men at 3:30 a.m. in a high crime 
area gave the officer not only the right but the duty to question 
them."l Brief of Respondent at 7. In discussing this question of 
1
 The State relies on State v.Belanger, 677 P.2d 781 (Wash. App. 
1984), for this proposition. However, the court in Belanger 
admitted that the officer there "did not have a well-founded 
suspicion of criminal activity based on articulable objective facts 
or circumstances which would have justified him in stopping and 
detaining the defendant in the first instance." Id. at 783 
(emphasis in original). The Belanger court then stated that the 
officer had "the limited right and duty to approach and inquire 
about what appeared to be suspicious circumstances." Id. (emphasis 
added). The facts in Belanger are very distinct from the case at 
bar. In Belanger the officer had the "limited" right and duty to 
approach and inquire because upon stopping his car he spotted "a 
rifle barrel protruding from defendant's duffle bag and pointed in 
his direction." Id. at 782. That fact in conjunction with others 
gave the officer the "limited" duty; nothing as acute occurred in 
the case at bar. 
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duty, often referred to by the State as justification for intruding 
into the rights of otherwise law abiding citizens, a commentator has 
reasoned: 
When writing opinions I have often been tempted 
to state the test of the reasonableness of police 
officer's conduct in terms of what the reaction 
would be if he had not done what he is charged 
with having done wrongfully. If you would fire 
the officer for not doing what he did, then what 
he did was reasonable. . . . I agree that it 
isn't a very stylish way of expressing the 
concept of reasonableness, and that somewhat 
circular reasoning is involved. But to me there 
is value in restating the question so that the 
whole problem may be seen. 
W. Schaefer, The Suspect and Society 41-42 (1967) (quoted in LaFave, 
Search and Seizure, § 9.3 n.60 (1987)). 
Despite the officer's reference to downtown Salt Lake City 
as a high crime area, a stroll along State Street in the early 
morning hours glancing into store windows is not per se criminal 
behavior. The State's position would seem to suggest that police 
officers have a duty to stop all early hour walkers. Such a 
requirement is not only contrary to basic constitutional rights and 
guarantees, but it is impractical as well. Had the officer left the 
appellant and his companions alone, he would not have come under 
fire for his behavior. He also had the option of merely observing 
them until something more justified action on his part. 
The United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 
47 (1979), stated that location alone was insufficient to justify a 
Terry stop. Id. at 52. The Court also added that "[i]n the absence 
of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the balance 
between the public interest and the appellant's right to personal 
security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police 
intervention." Id. That a police officer has a duty to investigate 
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citizens walking in the early morning hours is a stretch of the role 
police play in our society. Such a duty should only attach when a 
reasonable basis exists for the officer "in appropriate 
circumstances and in an appropriate manner [to] approach a person 
for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior . . . " 
Terry supra at 22.2 
A final admonition comes from the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals in United States v. Trullo, 809 F. 2d 108 (1st Cir. 1987). 
In upholding the investigation of police officers in a high crime 
area known as the "Combat Zone" of Boston and in conjunction with 
other prior observations, the Trullo court stated: 
[W]e believe it is appropriate to state that the 
facts presented by this case, in our view, 
represent the outermost reaches of a permissible 
Terry stop; and it should be borne in mind that 
" . . . in law as in life, today's satisfactory 
explanation may very well be tomorrow's lame 
excuse." 
Id. at 111 (quoting United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1280 
(2d Cir. 1979)). In the present case, where Officer Beesley could 
not articulate specific, objective facts upon which he based the 
stop of Mr. Trujillo, the initial stop was improper and any evidence 
flowing from that stop must be suppressed. 
* For cases where an officer would have been derelict in his duty 
see Commonwealth v. Wascom, 344 A.2d 630 (1975) (officer observes 
two men walking in business section at 12:30 a.m. each carrying 
armload of unwrapped commercial merchandise); Brooks v. United 
States, 159 A.2d 876 (D.C. App. 1960) (two men recognized as having 
prior larceny convictions carrying a new console record player with 
the store tags still attached); State v. Bailey, 410 So.2d 1123 (La. 
1982) (two men rolling a commercial battery charger down the street 
during the early morning hours); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 335 A.2d 512 
(1975)(carrying a check-writing machine down the street in a high 
crime area at 2 a.m.); and People v. Montgomery, 368 N.E.2d 752 
(1977)(individual running in a high crime area with a tape player). 
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POINT III. THE OFFICER WAS WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION TO 
CONDUCT A FRISK OF THE APPELLANT. 
The State supports the frisk of the Appellant by referring 
to eight independent factors in the possession of the officer at the 
time of the frisk. See Brief of Respondent at 5-7. These factors 
are scrutinized and successfully negated as grounds for a frisk of 
Mr. Trujillo in the Brief of Appellant at 6-21. However, in short, 
a frisk of the person is justifiable only when an officer can 
articulate a reasonable belief that the person to be frisked is 
armed and dangerous. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
The police officer is not entitled to seize and 
search every person whom he sees on the street or 
of whom he makes inquiries. Before he places a 
hand on the person of a citizen in search of 
anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, 
reasonable grounds for doing so. In the case of 
the self-protective search for weapons, he must 
be able to point to particular facts from which 
he reasonably inferred that the individual was 
armed and dangerous. 
Id. 64. In the case at bar, the officer stated that he was 
concerned for his safety "because of the nervous nature of the 
individuals" (T. 12). He later testified that in the past he had 
seen the same type of nervous conduct lead to the retrieving of 
weapons from the person when frisked (T. 30). The officer 
categorized his experience or feeling that the person may have a 
weapon as "intuition" (T. 30). 
An officer's intuition or hunch, however, cannot operate to 
give the officer the reasonable basis for a frisk. The United 
States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, supra, announced that "[d]ue 
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weight must be given, not to [an officer's] inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch1, but to the specific 
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in 
light of his experience." Id. at 31. An officer, therefore, must 
be able to articulate a reasonable belief that his safety is in 
jeopardy before conducting a frisk. Officer Beesley failed to 
articulate such a basis for the search. 
The State attempts to support the search of appellant's 
person with the testimony of the second officer stating that the 
appellant attempted to avoid the pat-down by pulling his hands away 
(T. 87). This testimony is insignificant. Not only does Officer 
Beesley directly contradict this statement when he testifies that 
Mr. Trujillo was very cooperative during the frisk (T. 12-13), but 
the statement is irrelevant—even assuming it to be factual—as the 
event occurred after the frisk had begun and therefore cannot be 
used as justification for the frisk. 
Most of the facts relied on by the State in claiming 
justification for the pat-down search appeared prior to the stop. 
If the officer was so fearful for his safety from those factors, the 
question must be asked as to why the officer did not immediately 
conduct a pat-down for safety or, in the alternative, await the 
arrival of his backup before even approaching the young men. The 
obvious inference is, of course, that the officer felt no fear from 
those factors. 
Additionally, the factors which allegedly appear only after 
the questioning are similarly unable to substantiate a rational 
concern for safety. The officer testified that the young men 
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answered his questions evasively (T. 24). However, a review of the 
record shows that they directly answered his questions (T. 25-27). 
Even if the young men were evasive in responding to the officer's 
question, such behavior is non-threatening and cannot be used to 
justify a frisk as case law clearly instruct that a person 
approached by an officer need not respond at all but may even walk 
away. See Royer, at 497-98 (refusal to listen or answer does not, 
without more, furnish grounds for detention). Neither does the lack 
of identification create an indicia of concern for safety. See 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (the United States Supreme 
Court declares unconstitutional a state statute requiring citizens 
to produce identification). 
The State also claims that as the officer exited his patrol 
car, he observed Mr. Trujillo walk away from the group and place the 
knapsack near a garbage can and then return to the group. Brief of 
Respondent at 6, factor 4. This action does not justify the frisk 
of Mr. Trujillo. Officer Beesley had testified that he feared he 
might be shot if he turned his back on the group; he alleged that 
fear was produced by the nervous nature of the young men (T. 12). 
The knapsack is irrelevant. It was away from the group and was also 
absent from Officer Beesley's articulations of concern for safety. 
Accordingly, the knapsack could not justify the frisk of Mr. 
Trujillo at all. 
As to the alleged nervousness, the Brief of Appellant (at 
13-15) negates any utility such a claim might have. In short, 
"nervousness" is a wholly subjective characterization subject to 
manipulation and artifice and should be devalued accordingly. Such 
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a claim requires more articulation than simply "nervous nature"; a 
specific movement or action must be required as mere suspicions and 
hunches alone are unable to support a frisk. See Terry v. Ohio, 
supra, at 31. 
Individually and together, the factors urged by the State 
to justify the actions of the officer must fail. They are 
subjective rather than objective articulations and they give no 
reasonable articulable justification for the search of Mr. Trujillo. 
Inasmuch as no articulable reasonable basis justified the 
frisk, the fruits thereof must be suppressed in accordance with the 
law outlined in Terry and as required by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Joseph 
Trujillo, asks this court to reverse his conviction and remand his 
case to the trial court for either dismissal of the charges or a new 
trial. 
Respecfully submitted this ^ ? day of f^ri^ L, 1987. 
KENtf&kL PETER^ KDN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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